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ABSTRACT
The United Nation's Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), signed by more
than 150 nations in June 1992, commits signatory countries to limit greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Article 3.3 of the FCCC states that
"efforts to address climate change may be carried out cooperatively by interested
Parties" and "policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective
so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost." These statements provide the
basis for the concept of Joint Implementation (JI) and the development of an
international system in tradeable emissions entitlements. Joint Implementation and
tradeable emissions entitlements offer an opportunity to curb GHG emissions at a low-
cost through international partnerships and cooperation.
Title IV of the United States' 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), also known as
the Acid Rain Program, is the largest public policy experiment in the use of tradeable
permits. It is also the first trading program to incorporate two voluntary programs, the
substitution and opt-in programs. These programs are analogous to JI projects and
therefore, provide instructive insight into the potential barriers to broad JI investment.
The response to the substitution and opt-in programs has been significantly different.
Many more units have entered the substitution program than the opt-in program. Based
on an analysis of these programs, this thesis concludes that the high monitoring cost
associated with Title IV compliance deters potential opt-in participants from entering
the Acid Rain Program. The similarity between Title IV's voluntary programs and JI
projects suggests that monitoring costs are a substantial transaction cost for JI
investment and that minimizing this cost is necessary for encouraging greater JI
participation.
Thesis Supervisor: A. Denny Ellerman
Senior Lecturer, Sloan School of Management
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was signed by more than 150
countries at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)
in June 1992. The FCCC aims to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG)
concentrations at a level that does not interfere with the Earth's climate system and
commits signatory countries, upon ratification, to develop national plans for reducing
GHG emissions. Under the FCCC, governments can utilize command-and-control or
market-oriented polices to abate national anthropogenic GHG emissions. Two market-
oriented policies, Joint Implementation (JI) and tradeable emissions entitlements,1
continue to gain international support as key policy instruments for mitigating climate
change. Joint Implementation and tradeable emissions entitlements offer the
opportunity to curb GHG emissions at a low-cost through international partnerships and
cooperation. However, the cost-effectiveness and success of these instruments in meeting
the FCCC's goal will depend on the structure of the JI projects as well as the
development of the tradeable emissions entitlement market.
Title IV of the United States' 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA), also known as
the Acid Rain Program, is the largest public policy experiment in the use of tradeable
permits. Additionally, it is the first trading program to incorporate two voluntary
programs, the substitution and opt-in programs. These programs are analogous to JI
projects because they allow non-mandated units to voluntarily enter Phase I of the Acid
Rain Program and participate in the Program's tradeable permit market. The
substitution provision allows Phase II-affected electric utility units to enter the Acid
Rain Program early while the opt-in provision applies to industrial sources that are not
otherwise required to comply with Title IV. Correspondingly, JI enables countries or
parties that have not ratified the FCCC or accepted a GHG emissions reduction
1 The words "entitlement" and "permit" are used throughout this thesis to differentiate between
an international trading system and the domestic Acid Rain Program, respectively. These terms
can be used interchangeably and are not meant to imply any distinct property or trading rights.
commitment to voluntarily contribute to the FCCC's stabilization objective through
international abatement actions.
The response to the substitution and opt-in programs has been markedly different. Many
more units have entered the substitution program than the opt-in program. This
disparity suggests that there is a cost or barrier to entering the opt-in program that does
not affect participation in the substitution program. The purpose of this thesis is to
investigate the cause for the differing responses to the two programs and based on this
analysis, to draw appropriate conclusions for the implementation of JI. The experience of
the Acid Rain Program offers an instructive comparison for JI as well as the
development of a tradeable emissions entitlement market.
1.1 The Science of Climate Change
Greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the use of fossil fuels and other human
activities are accumulating in the Earth's atmosphere and threatening to raise global
temperatures. Greenhouse gases occur naturally in the atmosphere and are transparent
to most of the Sun's visible radiation. However, by absorbing over 90 percent of the
infrared radiation emitted by the Earth, GHGs trap heat in the atmosphere and allow
the Earth to maintain an average surface temperature of about 15 degrees Celsius. Over
the past 200 years, the GHG atmospheric concentration has risen due to increasing
energy demand, industrial growth, and agricultural activities. This accumulation has
enhanced the natural greenhouse effect and is feared to be causing changes in the
Earth's natural climate pattern. These changes have potentially serious consequences
for the environment as well as many human activities.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that the Global
Mean Temperature (GMT) will increase by 0.9 to 3.5 degrees Celsius by 2100 as a result
of GHG emissions. (IPCC, 1996) A rise in the GMT does not reflect the regional
temperature changes that may occur or the potential variability of yearly temperature
fluctuations. Regional and yearly temperatures may increase more or less extremely
than the GMT, and the GMT estimate is only a proxy for these changes. Additionally,
due to the thermal inertia of the oceans, only 50 to 90 percent of the eventual
temperature change will be realized by 2100. The Earth's temperature will continue to
rise beyond 2100 even if GHG concentrations are stabilized by that time. Among the
most serious impacts of the increasing global temperature is the corresponding rise in
the sea level. The IPCC report estimates that the sea level will increase by 50
centimeters by 2100 as a result of the ocean's thermal expansion and the melting of
glaciers and ice-sheets. Projections of future climate change are uncertain, but current
climate models agree that continued accumulation of anthropogenic GHG emissions in
the atmosphere could cause an unprecedented shift in the Earth's natural ecological and
atmospheric systems.
The most prevalent GHG is carbon dioxide (CO2) which is emitted into the atmosphere
at a rate of approximately 6000 million tons per year. Since pre-industrial times, the
concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has increased from 275 parts per million by
volume (ppmv) to about 360 ppmv, an increase of more than 25 percent. Anthropogenic
sources are responsible for the majority of global CO2 emissions, and the accumulation of
CO 2 in the atmosphere is a direct result of the growing demand for and burning of fossil
fuels. (IPCC, 1996)
Other GHGs include methane, nitrous oxide, methyl chloroform, ozone, carbon
tetrachloride, carbon monoxide, and a number of chlorofluorocarbons, particularly CFC-
11 and CFC-12. These gases are emitted in much smaller quantities than CO2, and their
atmospheric concentrations are far less. However, some of these gases are strong
absorbers of infrared radiation and could play a major role in climate change. Molecule
for molecule, methane's potential contribution is 21 times greater than CO2's and CFC-
12's contribution is 15,800 times greater, but the strength of these molecules is
somewhat diminished by the fact that they have relatively short atmospheric lifetimes.
Overall, CO2 accounts for about one-half of the GHG contribution to potential global
warming. (Clarke, 1995)
The origin of the GHG emissions is an important issue in designing a policy instrument
to minimize climate change and its impacts. In 1989, twenty countries, mostly developed
countries, accounted for almost 80 percent of total CO 2 emissions.2 (Clarke, 1995)
Although the majority of GHG accumulation in the atmosphere is a result of activities
within industrialized countries, the share of CO 2 emissions from developing countries
continues to rise as these countries industrialize. In 1985, developing countries
accounted for approximately one-quarter of the global CO 2 emissions, but according to
Clarke, by 2025, this share will increase to about one-half, assuming these countries do
not attempt to abate their emissions. (Figure 1) Therefore, any policy for mitigating
climate change must take account of the developing countries' need to industrialize while
addressing the GHG contribution from both the developed and developing worlds.
Figure 1: Emissions of CO2 by Region
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1.2 Joint Implementation and Tradeable Emissions
Entitlements
The FCCC commits leading industrial nations to limit GHG emissions to 1990 levels by
the year 2000. Under the FCCC, Annex Is countries agree to "take the lead" in
combating global warming and to adopt national policies and measures to mitigate
climate change.4 These policies and measures "may be carried out cooperatively by
interested parties" and "should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the
lowest possible cost".5 Although the FCCC does not define strict guidelines for
implementing a global system to control GHG emissions, it establishes the basis for the
concept of JI and the development of an international system in tradeable emissions
entitlements. Joint Implementation allows parties to earn credit towards their
3 Annex I countries includes 23 OECD countries (excluding Mexico, Turkey, Hungary, and the
Czech Republic) and 12 Eastern and Central European countries (including both Hungary and
the Czech Republic). Annex II countries consist of the 23 OECD countries.
4 FCCC, Articles 3.1 and 4.2.(a).
5 FCCC, Article 3.3.
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commitment to reduce GHG emissions through cooperative international projects that
seek to reduce, avoid, or sequester GHG emissions. Tradeable entitlements are an
efficient means of reducing emissions at a low cost.
1.2.1 Definitions
A JI transaction is an agreement between an "investor" and a "host" in which the host
provides GHG abatement services in return for financial or technological investment.
The host earns emissions reduction "credits" through GHG abatement activities and
transfers all or some of these "credits" to the investor. In return, the investor provides
financial or technological services to the host such as funding, low-emitting energy
technologies, or improved information technology. The JI transaction is entirely
voluntary, and any party can act as a host or investor including national governments,
private enterprises, non-governmental agencies (NGOs), or intergovernmental
organizations (IGOs). (U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation, 1996) Because the cost of
reducing or sequestering GHG emissions varies among countries, JI offers the
opportunity to reduce emissions at a lower global cost than would be possible if each
country acted alone. Investors are likely to pursue JI projects in host countries where
the marginal cost of abatement is low and will, therefore, act to minimize the global cost
of mitigating climate change.
Whereas JI allows parties to invest in low-cost international projects for reducing GHG
emissions, a system of tradeable permits enables individual firms to seek the least-cost
method for achieving environmental compliance. Under a tradeable permit scheme, the
total allowable level of emissions is set in advance, and this quantity is allotted in the
form of permits among polluting firms. Affected firms that reduce their emissions below
the allotted level can sell their surplus permits to other firms or bank them for future
use.6 Firms that face a high marginal cost of abatement can supplement emissions
reduction activities with the purchase of additional emissions permits. Whether firms
participate in the tradeable permit market or not, they have the flexibility of reducing
6 The U.S. Acid Rain Program allows affected electric utilities to bank permits for future use, but
this is not true of all tradeable permit systems.
emissions through a variety of measures including technological improvements, fuel
switching, or the reassignment of production activities to cleaner plants.
1.2.2 A Structure for Mitigating Climate Change
Tom Tietenberg and David Victor have proposed a climate change policy structure that
incorporates voluntary JI projects and a tradeable emissions entitlement market. (Victor
and Tietenberg, 1994) Their framework evolves from an initial JI pilot stage to a fully
developed tradeable emissions entitlement market that involves all nations and includes
all GHGs. Tietenberg and Victor's proposal is comprehensive and clearly highlights the
administrative and market requirements for successfully implementing JI and a market
in tradeable emissions entitlements. Three key implementation issues include the role of
certification, monitoring, and enforcement in crediting emissions entitlement trades and
verifying emissions reductions. The design of the certification, monitoring, and
enforcement procedures impact the benefits and costs of the process, and therefore,
determine the cost-effectiveness of the program as well as the ability of individual
nations to contribute to the FCCC's goal. Tietenberg and Victor's proposal provides a
useful framework for analyzing potential barriers to the successful development of JI
projects and a tradeable GHG emissions entitlement market.
1.3 Thesis Outline
Chapter Two of this thesis discusses the rationale for utilizing JI and tradeable
entitlements as policy instruments for mitigating climate change. It summarizes current
support for and investment in JI projects and outlines Tietenberg and Victor's three
stage structure for mitigating climate change. Chapter Three describes the U.S. Acid
Rain Program. Specifically, it highlights the differences between the substitution and
opt-in programs and examines their role within the Acid Rain Program. Based on the
argument that monitoring and data costs have caused a lower level of participation in
the opt-in as compared to the substitution program, Chapter Four examines the
potential impact of these costs on JI projects and an international tradeable emissions
entitlements market. Chapter Five highlights the major points examined in this thesis.

CHAPTER 2: JOINT IMPLEMENTATION AND TRADEABLE
ENTITLEMENTS: TWO POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR
ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE
2.1 Rationale for Joint Implementation and Tradeable
Emissions Entitlements
Climate change is a global problem, and regardless of the geographical origin of
emissions, emissions reduction actions impact atmospheric concentrations of GHGs
equally. Therefore, to the extent that the marginal cost of abatement differs across
countries and regions, there exists the opportunity to minimize the economic impact of
mitigating climate change through international cooperation. The global stabilization of
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2020 is estimated to cost 0.8 to
2.2 percent of the gross world product. (IPCC, 1996) This estimate assumes that there is
no trade in CO2 emissions entitlements and varies due to differing views of the baseline
emissions level and future characteristics of the international energy system. The
potential efficiency gain from allowing international trade in CO2 emissions entitlements
is estimated to be 0.3 to 0.9 percent of the gross world product by the year 2020. (Table 1
(IPCC, 1996)) Although this estimate depends on the number of parties involved in the
emissions trading market as well as the emissions reduction target, it is clear that
international cooperation can substantially lower the global cost of mitigating climate
change.
Table 1: Cost Differences for Emissions Trading
ER.: Model.• GREEN Model-.
Year Ta($It.C) GDPLoss(%) Tax($ItO) GDP Loss (%W
2020 No Trade 2837 1.98 149 1.9
Trade 238 1.6 106 1.0
2050 No Trade 680 3.7 230 2.6
Trade 498 3.3 182 1.9
7 Consumption losses are discounted to 1990 at 5 percent per year, in trillions of 1990 dollars.
Table 2: Transfers and Change in Welfare given by the OECD Green Model
United Other Soviet China Energy India Total
__States OECD Union DCs9
1995: 9.5% abatement
transfers ($1000 million) -1.4 -1.7 1.6 1.8 -0.5 0.2 0
Household real income (% 0..0 0.0 1.3 1.0 -1.0 0.9 0
change)
2000: 18% abatement
transfers ($1000 million) -4.2 -8.6 6.0 7.4 -1.6 1.0 0
Household real income (% -0.2 -0.2 1.9 1.8 -2.3 1.2 -0.2
change)
2005: 25.7% abatement
transfers ($1000 million) -9.8 -17.2 12.0 16.7 -4.4 2.7 0
Household real income (% -0.4 -0.5 2.0 2.6 -3.6 1.4 -0.5
change)
2010: 32.7% abatement
transfers ($1000 million) -15.4 -30.6 17.8 31.2 -8.4 5.4 0
Household real income (% -0.7 -0.8 2.1 3.6 -5.0 1.7 -0.8
change)
2020: 44.8% abatement
transfers ($1000 million) -31.9 -64.1 28.7 75.7 -22.6 14.2 0
Household real income (% -1.3 -1.4 1.7 5.8 -7.4 2.4 -1.5
change)
Joint Implementation and tradeable entitlements not only enable parties to secure
global environmental benefits at a low global cost, but they also involve the possibility of
increased financial and technological transfers from developed to developing nations.
The OECD Green model estimates that the financial flows could amount to as much as
$75 billion by the year 2020. (Table 2 (Clarke, 1995)) The OECD results are based on an
overall reductions in CO2 emissions of 2 percent per year, with major emissions
reductions in OECD countries and a 20 percent increase in developing countries'
emissions during the period from 1990 to 2020. Due to the potential size of the financial
transfers associated with as well as the investment structure of JI projects, JI offers an
opportunity for industrialized countries to promote individual projects independently of
the participation of global tenders such as the Global Environment Facility (GEF).
8 Global aggregates are based on a 2 percent reduction in emissions from the baseline.
9 Energy-rich developing countries.
Increased private investment in JI may result in international institutional structures
and agreements that more efficiently allocate resources to environmental projects than
do the GEF or other international aid agencies. Projects developed under JI can result in
technology choices that not only meet the development objectives of host countries but
also achieve the environmental objectives of the FCCC.
2.2 Criticisms of Joint Implementation
Opponents of JI argue that JI reduces the willingness of developed countries to "take the
lead" in mitigating climate change, compromises the national sovereignty of host
countries, and is too costly. By allowing Annex I countries to offset their commitment to
reduce GHG emissions with investments in non-Annex I countries, JI decreases the
imperative for developed countries to invest in GHG abatement projects within their
own borders. The validity of these claims will depend on the implementation and final
structure of JI agreements in addition to the future commitments of all parties under the
FCCC. Any JI project involving international emissions abatement measures will
require reaching an agreement between two parties. There are costs and benefits
associated with negotiating agreements, and it is important to weigh both the potential
costs and environmental opportunities when evaluating any JI project.
Joint Implementation has been criticized for directly undermining the objectives of the
FCCC. It is feared that enabling Annex I countries to offset their emissions reduction
commitments could result in uncontrolled global emissions growth. (Jackson, 1995) This
implies that JI projects will not be monitored to ensure that they are achieving the
reductions claimed or that the emissions offsets gained through JI will not be equivalent
to the Annex I countries' reduction commitments. Initially, JI is unlikely to occur at a
large enough scale for this criticism to hold, and the number of allowable JI projects
available to each country can always be limited. Additionally, it is improbable that
Annex I countries will invest in JI projects that cannot be monitored or that result in a
greater amount of emissions due to emissions allocation or accounting differences
between the two nations. As long as there are credible certification and enforcement
measures, it will be difficult for parties to cheat or violate their commitment to reduce
GHG emissions.
Politically, JI is criticized for threatening the national interests and sovereignty of the
host country. (Parikh, 1995) This argument overlooks the fact that JI projects are
voluntary and that JI provides developing countries with direct access to financial and
technological resources. The amount of financial and technological resources available,
however, will depend on how JI investment affects and interacts with other
international monetary flows. Many critics of JI fear that the level of international aid
dedicated to other development issues will decline as a result of increased JI investment.
Although host countries may not always be in a strong position to negotiate for JI
projects that suit their development needs, JI offers an opportunity for developing
countries to attract additional international assistance. By designing appropriate JI
criteria and approval processes, the sovereignty of the host countries can be better
protected.
The attractiveness of JI is that it achieves GHG emissions reductions at a minimum
global cost. This argument assumes that the marginal cost of abating emissions in
developing countries and countries with economies in transition is lower than the
marginal cost in developed nations. It is unclear whether this is true or whether the
transaction costs associated with implementing JI, particularly monitoring costs, cause
international projects to be more costly than initially assumed. Opponents of JI argue
that transaction costs reduce the number of relatively low-cost JI projects and diminish
the potential contribution of JI to mitigating climate change. Allowing JI may cause
parties to overlook economical energy saving projects available in developed nations.
(Jackson, 1995)
2.3 International Support for Joint Implementation and
Tradeable Entitlements
In October 1993, President Clinton announced the U.S. Climate Change Action Plan for
stabilizing GHG emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000. Although the plan relied
entirely on domestic actions, the Administration recognized the potential for low-cost
abatement activities in other countries. In June 1994, the U.S. Government established
the U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation (USIJI). The USIJI aims to 1) encourage
rapid development and implementation of mutually voluntary, cost-effective projects,
particularly in developing countries and countries with economies in transition; 2)
promote a broad range of projects to test and evaluate methodologies for measuring,
tracking, and verifying JI projects; 3) establish an empirical basis for developing
international criteria for JI; and 4) encourage private sector investment and innovation
in technologies for reducing or sequestering GHG emissions. (U.S. Initiative on Joint
Implementation, 1996)
Any U.S. private sector firm, non-governmental organization (NGO), government
agency, or individual is eligible for participating in the USIJI program, and as of April
1996, the USIJI had reviewed fifty-one JI proposals. (U.S. Initiative on Joint
Implementation, 1996) Of these, fifteen were accepted, eighteen were placed "in
development", ten were rejected, and eight were withdrawn. The projects placed "in
development" were not accepted because they lacked host country acceptance, raised
financial and emissions additionality questions, or contained insufficient monitoring and
verification information. Table 3 lists the projects accepted into the USIJI program. The
USIJI is one of the first JI pilot programs worldwide and is designed to build a core of
experience and knowledge for post-pilot phase JI programs.
Table 3: USIJI Projects
Project Title U.S. Participants Host Country Participants Cumulative Projected Project
GHG Emissions Reductions
, 
__ 
(mt C)o1
Belize
Rio Bravo Carbon * Nature Conservancy . Programme for Belize 1,300,000
Sequestration Pilot Project . Wisconsin Electric Power Company
* Detroit Edison
* Pacificorp
* Cinergy
Costa Rica
Aeroenergia S.A. Wind * Power Systems, Inc. * Aeroenergia, SA 9,800
Facility . Bluefields, International
* EnergyWorks
BioDiversifix: Forest * The Nature Conservancy * Guanacaste Conservation Area 5,040,000
Restoration * National System of Conservation
Areas
* National Institute of Biodiversity
CARFIX: Sustainable Forest * Wachovia Timberland Investment Management * Foundation for the Development of 5,939,000
Management Central Volcanic Mountain Range
* MINAE
Dona Julia Hydroelectric * New World Power Corporation * MINAE 57,400
Project * Compania Hidroelectrica Dona Julia
ECOLAND: Esquinas * Tenaska, Inc. * COMBOS Foundation 345,500
National Park * Trexler and Associates, Inc. * MINAE
* National Fish and Wildlife Foundation * Council of the Osa Conservation
Area
Klinki Forestry Project * Reforest the Tropics, Inc. * Cantonal Agricultural Center of 1,968.000
Turrialba
Plantas Eolicas Wind Facility * Merrill International, Inc. * Plantas Eolicas S.A. 71,800
* Charter Oak Energy, Inc.
* Northeast Utilities
* KENETECH Windpower, Inc.
10 Metric Tons of Carbon Equivalent.
Project Title U.S. Participants Host Country Participants Cumulative Projected Project
GHG Emissions Reductions
(mt C) 10
Tierras Morenas Windfarm * New World Power Corporation * MINAE 51,000
* Energia del Nuevo Mundo S.A.
* Moilnos de Viento del Arenal S.A.
The Czech Republic
City of Decin: Fuel-Switching * Center for Clean Air Policy * City of Decin 165,600
for District Heating * Wisconsin Electric Power Company
* Commonwealth Edison Company
* NIPSCO Development Company, Inc.
Honduras
Bio-Gen Biomass Power * Nations Energy Corporation . Biomasa-Generacion 647,400
Generation Project * International Utility Efficiency Partnership
* Add-on Energy 1
Solar-Based Rural * Enersol Associates, Inc. * COMARCA 4,700
Electrification * AHDEJUMAR
* AHDE
Nicaragua
El Hoyo - Monte Galan * Trans-Pacific Geothermal Corporation * C and R, Inc. 5,391,000
Geothermal Project
Russian Federation
RUSAFOR: Saratov * Oregon State University * Saratov Forest Management District, 35,000
Afforestation Project * U.S. EPA Russian Federal Forest Service
* International Forestry Institute
RUSAGAS: Fugitive Gas * Oregon State University * GAZPROM 8,182,000
Capture Project * U.S. EPA * Center for Energy Efficiency
* Sealweld Corporation
* Sustainable Development Technology
Corporation
International criteria for JI were initially discussed at the first meeting of the FCCC
Conference of the Parties (COP-1) in Berlin in April of 1995. At COP-i, the Parties
agreed to implement an initial pilot phase of JI referred to as "Activities Implemented
Jointly" (AIJ). The initial AIJ phase will end no later than the year 2000, and during
AIJ, no credits will be awarded to any party for achieving GHG emissions reductions.
(U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation, 1996) In addition, the COP-1 resulted in the
Berlin Mandate, an agreement to set quantified GHG reduction targets for specific years
(such as 2005, 2010, or 2020). By initiating the discussion of JI and quantifiable
emissions reduction targets, AIJ and the Berlin Mandate provide a basis for analyzing
the feasibility of JI and likelihood that nations will accept a verifiable emissions cap. An
emissions cap is necessary for establishing a tradeable emissions entitlement system and
useful for crediting international JI projects.
At the second meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP-2) in July of 1996, the U.S.
voiced its support of JI and the use of tradeable entitlements as a least-cost method for
mitigating climate change. (Affairs, 1996) Recognizing that most developed countries
will not achieve the goal of reducing emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, the U.S.
advocated the adoption of medium term reduction targets, after 2010, that are both
binding and achievable. Individual nations should be allowed maximum flexibility in
achieving these reduction targets and mitigation measures should be implemented
through national programs. Additionally, the U.S. stressed the need for all nations,
including developing nations, to take actions to limit GHGs. The COP-2 meeting
provided a blueprint for action that was widely endorsed but failed to define specific
provisions or requirements for JI. Instead, it instructed the Parties "to accelerate
negotiations on the text of a legally binding protocol or another legal instrument to be
completed in due time for adoption at the third session of the Conference of the Parties""
in December 1997.
11 Geneva Declaration.
The U.S. Draft Protocol Framework is the U.S. proposal of a climate change policy
architecture. The January 1997 Draft allows carbon equivalentl2 emissions trading
among Parties and credits JI projects with non-participating countries. 13 Additionally, it
requires the development of national measurement and reporting systems for tracking
anthropogenic emissions as well as compliance and enforcement programs. The Protocol
provides a flexible architecture that allows future policy changes, but it lacks a clear
mechanism for moving from short-term to long-term goals. According to Schmalensee,
"the Report pays insufficient attention to the long-term consequences of possible near-
term choices and fails to develop analytical points of which policy-makers should be
aware."14 Despite its short-term view, the U.S. Draft Protocol Framework is a clear
commitment in support of JI and tradeable emissions entitlements as necessary
instruments in the climate change policy architecture.
2.4 A Comprehensive Process for Achieving GHG Emissions
Reductions
Tom Tietenberg and David Victor have proposed a comprehensive structure for
mitigating climate change that incorporates voluntary JI projects and culminates in an
international tradeable emissions entitlement market. (Tietenberg and Victor, 1994) As
compared to the architecture proposed in the U.S. Draft Protocol Framework, Tietenberg
and Victor's proposal provides a framework for developing JI and a tradeable emissions
entitlement market from an initial to a final phase. The framework accounts for short
and long-term economic and environmental concerns and allows flexibility in adapting to
new scientific data or incorporating additional parties.
According to Tietenberg and Victor, an effective trading system relies on two types of
institutions and procedures. The first involves the market institutions that specify the
conditions under which entitlements can be exchanged and provide information on the
entitlement trades as well as financial transfers. These market institutions must be
12 A metric ton of carbon equivalent is one metric ton of carbon or any quantity of one or more
other GHGs equivalent to one metric ton as determined by the global warming potentials defined
in the U.S. Draft Protocol Framework.
13 U.S. Draft Protocol Framework, Articles 6 and 7.
14 Schmalensee, Greenhouse Policy Architectures and Institutions, p. 1.
complemented by administrative institutions. Administrative procedures ensure that the
market process operates efficiently and produces the environmentally desirable outcome.
Tietenberg and Victor highlight the issues associated with designing the administrative
structure, including the role of certification, monitoring, and enforcement, and
recommend a system that evolves through three stages.
The first stage has been established by the FCCC and involves only those countries that
have accepted the goal of stabilizing GHG emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.
The stabilization goal is not a requirement and only applies to a limited number of
countries. According to Tietenberg and Victor, countries have two choices for meeting
this goal. They can either seek reductions within their own borders or through
international abatement projects. The transborder approach closely resembles the AIJ
pilot phase. However, the AIJ phase and Tietenberg and Victor's first stage differ in that
AIJ projects do not receive credit for achieving emissions reductions. Although the first
stage bears little resemblance to a market in tradeable emissions entitlements, it
enables participants to learn about the comparative costs of monitoring and measuring
emissions as well as the costs of different types of JI projects.
In the second stage of Tietenberg and Victor's JI process, the stabilization goal is
replaced by specific emissions requirements for each of the participating countries. The
COP-1 and COP-2 meetings as well as the U.S. Draft Protocol Framework have begun
the international discussion of emissions reduction targets, but strict requirements have
not yet been set. Once reduction requirements are defined, they will provide a basis for
allocating actual emissions entitlements that are freely transferable among participating
countries. Although Tietenberg and Victor limit emissions entitlements to CO2 during
this stage, trades in other GHGs are possible subject to certification procedures. The
informal trading system of the first stage is replaced by an organized exchange as well
as a reporting network designed to minimize transaction costs and provide a public
means of accountability. The second stage does not presume any particular domestic
strategy for achieving emissions reductions.
During the second stage, non-participating countries can enter the trading process in
two ways. First, non-participating countries can negotiate a country-specific limit on CO2
emissions with the COP and thereby receive a certified number of national emissions
entitlements. By accepting a country-specific limit, the non-participating country would
become a full participant in the FCCC agreement and gain complete access to the
tradeable entitlement market. This transition is comparable to an Annex B country, as
defined by the U.S. Draft Protocol Framework, accepting an aggregate emissions cap
similar to, but less constraining than, the cap for an Annex A or Annex I country. The
U.S. Draft Protocol Framework's differentiation between Annex A and Annex B
countries corresponds to Tietenberg and Victor's distinction between participating and
non-participating nations. A second means for non-participating nations to join the
tradeable entitlement market is by creating and selling offset reductions through
individual JI projects. The second method is much more limited than the first, but it
allows increased participation by countries that are not yet prepared to fully agree to the
FCCC's restrictions.
The final stage of Tietenberg and Victor's process expands entitlement trading to include
more participants, a greater number of trades, and all GHGs. More governments will
implement domestic markets that parallel the international trading market and a much
larger number of trades conducted privately between sources will be expected.
Developing the market in these dimensions will result in a denser trading market and
greater potential cost savings and flexibility. Each of these developments is a matter of
degree and three administrative procedures, certification, monitoring, and enforcement,
are necessary for a smooth evolution from the first to final stage.
2.5 Essential Administrative Procedures
2.5.1 Certification
Two types of carbon dioxide emissions entitlements exist in Tietenberg and Victor's
climate change structure: 1) allocated entitlements and 2) created entitlements. Each
type of entitlement involves its own set of certification requirements. Allocated
entitlements are received by countries that accept country-specific emissions reduction
targets. These entitlements are used to justify emissions during a given year, traded, or
banked for future use. Created entitlements arise from emissions abatement actions
taken in non-participating countries and once certified, can be traded on an equivalent
basis as the allocated entitlements.
The certification requirements for created entitlements differ from the requirements for
allocated entitlements. Allocated entitlements are certified once a country accepts an
emissions reduction target. Created entitlements are certified on a case-by-case basis. As
opposed to allocated entitlements, created entitlements must satisfy the following three
conditions: 1) created entitlements must demonstrate emissions reductions below an
established baseline, 2) created emissions reductions must be quantifiable and feasible,
and 3) created emissions reductions must be enforceable. (U.S. Initiative on Joint
Implementation, 1996)
2.5.2 Monitoring and Enforcement
Monitoring provides the basis for determining whether a particular country or party is
complying with its emissions reduction commitments, whether GHG emissions are being
reduced at a global level, and whether failures to achieve targets are due to the design of
the FCCC protocol itself or its implementation. Specifically, in the case of tradeable
emissions entitlements, monitoring assures that emissions levels are matched by
certified entitlements and provides a base of information for determining whether
enforcement actions are necessary.
Two classes of sources must be monitored in the climate change policy architecture.
First, emissions sources in participating countries require monitoring to ensure that
emissions levels are at or below target levels. Under the FCCC, participating countries
have agreed to report national GHG emissions, and most of these nations are already
technically prepared to provide accurate emissions data.15 The second class of sources
that demands monitoring are sources in non-participating countries that have earned
created entitlements through JI projects. Monitoring requirements for these sources
include establishing baseline data, verifying that offset reductions are achieved, and
15 FCCC, Articles 4.1.(a) and 4.2.(b).
ensuring that total emissions do not exceed the target emissions level minus any traded
credits.
While monitoring provides the information for judging claims of non-compliance,
enforcement is the process for imposing penalties. The challenge to a tradeable
entitlement system is that as the price of the entitlements rises, incentives to defect will
increase and as the JI system evolves, the number of actors in the market will grow.
Traditional international enforcement instruments are not suited to handle a global
entitlement market that results in large financial transfers and involves many parties.
Therefore, Tietenberg and Victor argue that JI and the tradeable emissions entitlement
market will have to rely on domestic enforcement, international standards and accepted
penalties, as well as a clear dispute resolution process.
2.5.3 Implementation Issues
The structure of the certification, monitoring, and enforcement procedures influences the
evolution of Tietenberg and Victor's proposal from its first to final stage. Through the
definition of the emissions baseline level, allocation of entitlements, and treatment of
created as compared to allocated entitlements, the certification requirements influence
the incentives for non-participating countries to accept JI projects. The monitoring and
enforcement requirements are equally important and act to verify the value of the
emissions entitlements and to build confidence in the tradeable entitlement market.
The definition of the emissions baseline level and allocation of entitlements is relatively
straightforward for the countries that have accepted country-specific emissions reduction
targets. Once the FCCC's stabilization goal is replaced by a specific reduction target,
each country will receive entitlements based on a combination of their historical
emissions levels and an allocation rule. These countries have accepted the responsibility
of mitigating climate change through emissions reductions. Therefore, they are likely to
agree to a mutually acceptable allocation rule through international negotiations. The
difficulty in assigning entitlements arises in the case of created entitlements.
The certification of created entitlements raises the issue of "additionality". Created
entitlements are intended to reflect "additional" emissions reductions, not reductions
that would have occurred regardless of whether the JI project was undertaken or not.
Currently, USIJI proposals are required to demonstrate additionality by presenting a
"reference case", showing the emissions that would have occurred without the JI project,
as well as a "project case", demonstrating the emissions reduction projections over the
life of the project. (U.S. Initiative on Joint Implementation, 1996) The calculation of the
reference and project cases is a technical issue and requires some form of verification if
parties are to accept JI as a legitimate tool for mitigating climate change. Proving that
JI emissions reductions are real and additional is necessary both for effectively crediting
created entitlements and for ensuring the integrity of the international tradeable
emissions entitlement market. These concerns can be partially alleviated by utilizing
appropriate monitoring procedures as well as international guidance for standardizing
the created entitlements certification procedures.
The relationship between the created entitlements emissions reductions and the
eventual emissions cap for the host country influences the incentives for non-
participating countries to accept JI projects and to limit their current emissions. An
eventual emissions cap based solely on historical emissions creates an incentive to defer
abatement actions and to reject JI investment now in order to elevate the future
established cap. Additionally, a historical emissions rule does not account for developing
countries' desire to continue to industrialize. It is generally agreed that developing
countries will be given entitlements according to an allocation rule that accounts for
future development, and this rule may be calculated on a population or GDP basis.
(Shah, 1994) To the extent that the eventual emissions cap is determined independently
of historical emissions, the incentive to pollute more now is decreased. The issue of
"additionality" affects the certification of individual JI projects, while the determination
of the eventual emissions cap influences the incentive for host countries to accept JI
investment.
The AIJ program highlights the importance of establishing an acceptable crediting
system for created entitlements whether it is based on historical emissions or allows for
additional industrial growth. According to a 1995 U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
study on the benefits and obstacles of JI projects, a primary obstacle to participation in
the AIJ program is the lack of GHG offsets crediting. (Vetleseter, 1995) At the COP-i,
the parties agreed that an investor conducting JI projects under the AIJ pilot phase
would not receive credit for any GHG emissions reductions. Essentially, this decision
removed a major benefit from investing in JI projects and has acted to discourage broad
participation in the AIJ program.
2.6 Chapter Summary
The major points presented in this Chapter are:
* Joint Implementation and tradeable emissions entitlements enable international
parties to secure global environmental benefits at a low-cost and offer developing
countries an opportunity to attract financial and technological investment.
* Critics of JI claim that JI enables Annex I countries to avoid their commitment to
"take the lead" in mitigating climate change, threatens the sovereignty of host
countries, and is too costly.
* Joint Implementation and tradeable emissions entitlements are key components to
the U.S. Draft Protocol Framework and continue to gain international support as
policy instruments for mitigating climate change.
* Tom Tietenberg and David Victor have proposed a comprehensive three-stage
process that incorporates voluntary JI projects and culminates in an international
tradeable emissions entitlement market. Their proposal provides a framework for
analyzing the potential barriers to implementing JI and a system of tradeable
emissions entitlements.
* Credible certification and monitoring procedures are necessary for establishing
confidence in JI and a tradeable emissions entitlement market.

CHAPTER 3: THE UNITED STATES ACID RAIN PROGRAM
The Acid Rain Program enacted in Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments
(CAAA) is the largest public policy experiment in the use of tradeable emissions permits.
The program's primary goal is the reduction of annual sulfur dioxide (SO 2) emissions by
10 million tons or to a level 40 percent below 1980 levels. The SO 2 emissions reduction is
achieved through an emissions trading system and affects only the electric utility
industry which accounts for almost 70 percent of national SO 2 emissions. By establishing
an emissions cap and allocating tradeable emissions permits to individual utilities, the
Acid Rain Program allows utilities to seek the least-cost method for meeting the
environmental restrictions. Results from 1995 show that utilities have not only over-
complied with the emissions limitation by emitting 40 percent less than the program's
emissions cap (EPA, 1996) but have also achieved these reductions at about one half the
cost they would have incurred under a more conventional approach. (GAO, 1994)
To achieve its SO2 emissions reduction, the Acid Rain Program requires a two-phase
tightening of the emissions restrictions placed on fossil fuel-fired power plants. Phase I
begins in 1995 and affects 263 unitsl 6 at 110 mostly coal-burning electric utility plants
located in the Eastern and Mid-Western States. These units must reduce emissions to a
level equivalent to 2.5 pounds of SO2 per million Btu (lbs S02/mmBtu) times the average
of their 1985 through 1987 fuel use or "baseline". Phase II, which becomes effective in
2000, tightens the annual emissions limits placed on the Phase I units, sets restrictions
on about 2000 smaller units fired by coal, oil, and gas, and imposes a permanent annual
emissions cap of 8.95 million tons. All existing generation units with an output capacity
greater than 25 megawatts (MW) as well as all new utility units must comply with the
Title IV provisions. The two-phased approach is designed to achieve early reductions by
the largest, highest polluting plants that are thought to contribute most to the acid rain
problem in the Eastern half of the U.S. and Canada.
16 A unit is defined as a "fossil-fuel-fired combustion device" in Section 402 of the CAAA and
corresponds to a single generator and associated boiler.
Title IV also calls for a 2 million ton reduction in nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions from
1980 levels. Similar to the SO 2 emissions reduction requirements, the NOx program is
implemented in two phases, in the years 1996 and 2000. However, the NOx program
does not permanently cap NOx emissions nor does it utilize an allowance trading
system. All of the NOx emissions reductions will be achieved by coal-fired utility boilers
that are required to install low NOx burner technologies and to meet stricter emissions
standards.
3.1 Key Elements of the Tradeable Permit Market
An "allowance" or trading unit entitles its holder to emit one ton of SO 2 during a certain
year. Allowances can be traded with any party participating in the Acid Rain Program or
banked for use in a future year, but allowances cannot be brought forward for use in an
earlier year. Each regulated source in the program must hold allowances equal to their
total SO2 emissions in that year. Any source that exceeds its emissions limit must pay a
penalty of $2000 per ton of excess SO2 emitted and offset the excess emissions with an
equivalent reduction in the following year. Newly constructed facilities do not receive
allowances but must obtain them from existing plants.
The owner or operator of any source subject to the Acid Rain Provisions is required to
install, certify, and operate a Continuous Emissions Monitoring System (CEMS) on each
affected unit at the source. The CEMS tracks hourly emissions which are reported to the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) each quarter. Accurate, complete, and
consistent emissions measurement data are essential for ensuring the integrity of the
market-based allowance system and the achievement of the emissions reduction goals.
According to EPA's 1995 Compliance Results, 98 percent of the installed and tested
monitors passed the required 10 percent relative accuracy test, and these monitors were
successfully operating over 95 percent of the time.
Allowance transactions and the status of allowance accounts are tracked by EPA's
Allowance Tracking System (ATS), an electronic record-keeping and notification system.
The ATS provides EPA with the necessary data for determining compliance with the
emissions limitations. Any party can open an ATS account, and each account contains
the serial number of traded allowances, the individual unit's account balance, and the
name of the account representative. The ATS is intended to expedite the flow of data
between EPA and the utilities and to promote the development of an efficient permit
trading system.
In addition to the private sales and purchases of allowances that continuously occur
through the tradeable permit market, EPA holds an annual auction and a direct sale.
The auctions are intended to send a price signal to the allowance market as well as to
provide utilities and other parties with an additional avenue for purchasing permits. The
direct sale offers allowances at a fixed price of $1,500 (adjusted for inflation) and
guarantees Independent Power Producers (IPPs) first priority in purchasing the
allowances. This guarantee enables IPPs to access the necessary allowances for building
or operating any new units.
Electric utilities can choose how to dispatch electricity, and the two-phased nature of the
Acid Rain Program creates an incentive for utilities to shift generation and emissions
from Phase I to Phase II units. In order to account for possible shifts in emissions
through the reduced utilization of a Phase I unit,1 7 Title IV requires the submission of a
Reduced Utilization Plan for any Phase I unit that will be used below its baseline as a
method of compliance. The plan must either 1) designate a Phase II unit (compensating
unit) to which generation was shifted; 2) account for the reduced utilization through
energy conservation or improved unit efficiency measures; or 3) designate sulfur-free
generators (such as hydroelectric or nuclear generators). A Reduced Utilization Plan is
not required if the underutilized Phase I unit surrenders allowances in proportion to the
reduced utilization, if over-utilization occurs at other Phase I units in the same dispatch
system, or if there is a decrease in the total dispatch system load.
The Acid Rain Program allows for a number of compliance options. Utilities can reduce
emissions by burning cleaner fuel, by reassigning some of its energy production capacity
17 A Phase I unit is underutilized if, in any year in Phase I, the total annual utilization of fuel at
the unit is less than it baseline.
to lower emitting units, or by utilizing energy conservation measures to reduce total
electrical demand. Because of the wide variety of utility plant types, ages, and fuel use,
there are large variations in the costs per ton of SO2 removed. This cost differential
provides utilities with a substantial opportunity to take advantage of an emissions
trading scheme. Generating units with high marginal costs of abatement can achieve
emissions reductions by supplementing emissions abatement actions with the purchase
of emissions permits. By reducing emissions below the target level, units with lower
marginal costs of control can generate additional revenue through the sale of excess
permits.
3.2 Compliance Results of the Acid Rain Program
The Acid Rain Program has proven to be both an environmental and economic success.
Emissions reductions achieved in 1995 were 3.4 million tons greater than the target
level for the first year of the program, and these reductions have benefited the national
environment. (Figure 2) According to a U.S. Geological Survey, SO2 emissions reductions
Figure 2: 1995 SO2 Emissions Reductions by Phase I Affected Utility Units
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have resulted in as much as a 10 to 25 percent drop in 1995 rainfall acidity in the Mid-
West, Northeast, and Mid-Atlantic Regions of the U.S. (Survey, 1996) Additionally,
efficiency improvements and innovation have accompanied the implementation of Title
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IV. Not only have scrubber costs dropped by 40 percent or more below 1989 levels, but
scrubber efficiencies have also improved from 90 percent in 1988 to 95 percent or more
in current retrofits. (EPA, 1996) Innovative responses to Title IV include the
development of sophisticated computer tools to report and track emissions and are
reflected in the decreasing scrubber costs.
Table 4: Allowances Sold in the EPA Auction and in the Private Market
Number of Number of Total
Allowances Sold in Allowances Sold in Allowances
EPA Auctions the Private Market Sold
Through March 199318 150,010 130,000 280,010
April 1993-March 1994 176,200 226,384 402,584
April 1994-March 1995 176,400 1,466,966 1,643,396
April 1995-March 1996 275,000 4,917,560 5,292,560
Total 777,610 6,740,940 7,518,550
The allowance trading market increasingly resembles a more established commodities
market. At the time Title IV was passed, the projected price for Phase I allowances was
about $250 to $350 per ton of SO2 and the price for Phase II allowances was $500 to
$700 per ton. Actual allowance prices have been much lower than expected, and the
price of a Phase I allowance has dropped to as low as $63 per ton. In addition, the total
volume of permit trading has been much larger than the minimum amount of trading
required for all units to meet compliance in 1995. (Ellerman et. al., 1996) Table 4 shows
the level of private trading as well as annual EPA auction sales and demonstrates the
large increase in trading since 1994. (Bailey et. al., 1996) The number of allowances sold
in the private market is a low estimate because it only reflects those trades that the
electric utilities chose to report to the ATS. Both the evolution of the allowance price and
the volume of trading reflect an allowance trading market that is increasingly becoming
more efficient and highlight the fact that electric utilities are taking advantage of the
tradeable permit market in order to meet the 1990 CAAA emissions limitations.
is Allowance trading began in 1992.
The Acid Rain Program is not only the largest domestic program to incorporate
tradeable permits, but it is also the first trading program to include two voluntary
compliance programs, the substitution and opt-in programs. The substitution program
allows Phase II affected utility units to voluntarily enter Phase I of the Acid Rain
Program whereas the opt-in program allows non-utility, industrial sources to enter the
program, receive tradeable allowances, and trade allowances with other utility and non-
utility sources. The substitution and opt-in programs contribute to the compliance
flexibility of the Acid Rain Program and have resulted in an increased level of
participation in the program.
3.3 Substitution Program
An owner or operator of a Phase I unit has the option of reassigning or substituting, in
whole or in part, the affected power plants' SO2 reduction requirements to a designated
Phase II unit (substitution unit). The only restriction in designating a substitution unit
is that the substitution unit and Phase I affected unit must share a common owner or
operator. Allowances are allocated to the substitution unit based on the least of three
emissions rates for the unit in question: 1) 1985 actual SO2 emissions rate (or 1985
allowable SO2 emissions rate); 2) the greater of 1989 or 1990 actualSO2 emissions rate;
or 3) the most stringent Federal or State allowable SO2 emissions rate applicable in 1995
through 1999 as of November 15, 1990. Each substitution unit's allowance allocation is
calculated by multiplying the lowest of the above emissions rates by the unit's fuel use
baseline. By increasing compliance flexibility, the substitution program is designed to
reduce the overall costs of Phase I compliance while achieving equivalent emissions
reductions.
Following approval, a substitution unit becomes subject to all Phase I requirements with
regard to SO2 and NOx emissions. Incentives for joining the substitution program
include early access to the tradeable SO2 permit market as well as the potential benefit
of avoiding the stricter Phase II NOx emissions requirements. Electric utilities are a
main contributor to national NOx emissions and the majority of these emissions come
from coal-fired power plants. The CAAA requires Phase I units with Group 1 boilers to
reduce annual NOx emissions by 400,000 tons from 1980 levels between the years 1996
and 1999. Coal-fired boilers are classified as Group 1 or 2 depending on their type of
burner technology.19 Beginning in 2000, NOx emissions will be reduced annually by 2
million tons by 1) maintaining the same standards for Phase I, Group 1 boilers; 2)
imposing stricter standards on Phase II, Group 1 boilers; and 3) establishing new
standards for Group 2 boilers.
Through the substitution program, Phase II units with Group 1 boilers can comply early
with the Phase I NOx requirements and avoid the more costly standards of Phase II.
These units, as long as they substituted in by January 1995, are never subject to the
stricter NOx emissions limitations but incur the extra cost associated with early
compliance. This is commonly termed "NOx grandfathering". (Montero, 1997) Units that
substitute in after January 1995 are not subject to the revised NOx limitations until
2008 and fall under the NOx early election provision. The early election provision applies
to any Phase II unit that chooses to meet the NOx emissions reductions early whether
the unit is a designated substitution unit or not. The early compliance provision is
always an option, and therefore, the only NOx benefit of the substitution program is the
NOx grandfathering.
3.3.1 Substitution Program in Practice
Due to initial rule changes and controversies, the substitution program was not expected
to draw much participation. However, a total of 42 electric utilities or 182 of 629 eligible
Phase II units have voluntarily entered the program. (Montero, 1997) This constitutes a
participation level of almost 30 percent and is a clear indication that the substitution
program has created incentives for Phase II affected units to voluntarily enter the Acid
Rain Program.
19 Group 1 boilers include tangentially-fired boilers and dry bottom wall-fired boilers and other
units applying cell burner technology. Group 2 includes wet-bottom wall-fired boilers, cyclone
boilers, boilers applying cell burner technology, vertically-fired boilers, arch-fired boilers, and
any other type of utility boiler that is not included in Group 1.
There are three reasons for units to enter the substitution program including a low level
of unrestricted emissions, low control costs, and NOx grandfathering. Montero has
shown that while some non-affected units have joined the substitution program because
their actual unrestricted emissions are below their historical emissions and therefore
receive excess allowances by substituting in, others have entered the program because
they have low marginal control costs. Additionally, Montero demonstrates that among
the 124 substitution units with Group 1 boilers, 104 are subject to NOx grandfathering
and that the incentives for substituting in increase dramatically for units with Group 1
boilers and high NOx marginal costs. Table 5 (Montero, 1997) summarizes the
participation statistics of the substitution program.
Although there has been significant participation in the substitution program, the
substitution units have had little impact on the environmental performance of the Acid
Rain Program. Approximately 96 percent of the 1993 to 1995 SO2 emissions reduction
Table 5: Substitution program statistics
Variables. Phase 1 Substitution Total Other
Affected Units Phase I Eligible
Units Units Units
Number of Units 263 182 445 447
Total Capacity (MW) 88,007 41, 643 129, 650 98,588
Coal-fired Units 257 154 411 299
Units with Scrubbers before 1 25 26 31
1990
Units with Title IV Scrubbers 27 0 27 0
Baseline Fuel Use (1012 Btu) 4,363 1,740 6,103 3,223
Total 1993 Fuel Use 4,395 1,718 6,113 3,890
Total 1995 Fuel Use 4,551 1,931 6,637 4,583
SO2 emissions 1988 (mm) 8.89 1.28 10.17 2.34
SO2 emissions 1993 7.58 0.97 8.55 2.51
SO2 emissions 1995 4.45 0.85 5.30 2.88
Average SO• rate 1988 3.86 2.01 3.11 1.14
(lbs/mmBtu)
Average SO rate 1993 3.30 1.67 2.63 1.08
Average SO2 rate 1995 2.10 1.21 1.74 1.04
1995 Allowances (106)20 7.22 1.33 8.55 -
20 This does not include auction allowances.
comes from Phase I units. (Table 5) This implies that the majority of 1995 SO2
emissions reduction is due to actions by Phase I units. Additionally, 15 percent of the 3.4
million allowances banked for future use are allowances from substitution units.
(Montero, 1997) The substitution program has successfully created incentives for Phase
II units to enter the Acid Rain Program early, but these units have not contributed
substantially to the environmental accomplishments of Title IV.
3.4 Opt-in Program
The opt-in program allows all operating stationary combustion sources that emit SO2 but
are not otherwise required to meet the mandatory SO 2 emissions limitations of Title IV
to voluntarily enter the Acid Rain Program. Combustion sources are defined as fossil
fuel-fired boilers, turbines, or internal combustion engines. An opt-in source must comply
with the same or similar provisions as utility units and are allocated allowances upon
entry into the opt-in program. Allowances are allocated based on the product of the
source's average 1985 through 1987 fuel use and the least of three emissions rates: 1)
the 1985 actual SO 2 emissions rate; 2) 1985 allowable SO2 emissions rate; and 3) the
allowable SO2 emissions rate at the time the combustion source submits an opt-in permit
application. If the source began operation after 1985, an "alternative baseline" is
calculated based on the average heat input for all fuel consumed during the first three
consecutive calendar years for which the combustion source operated after December 31,
1985. (EPA, 1995)
By reducing emissions below its allowance allocation, an opt-in source can sell unused
allowances on the SO2 permit market. Opting-in is profitable only if the revenue from
selling allowances exceeds the combined costs of the emissions reduction and the costs of
entering the opt-in program. Although the opt-in program results in the allocation of
additional allowances above the 8.95 million ton cap set for utility units, it does not
increase total SO2 emissions. The allowances are allocated to existing sources and do not
authorize new emissions. Through trading, emissions merely shift between the utility
and industrial sectors, but total emissions do not increase. Additionally, opt-in
regulation requires an opt-in source to return allowances when it reduces its utilization,
shuts down, or withdraws from the program.
By March 1997, five companies had applied to the opt-in program. DuPont and the
Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) submitted opt-in applications that were
subsequently accepted while Union Camp, the City of Dover, and the Iowa Interstate
Power Company withdrew their applications citing financial and administrative issues.
Union Camp submitted an application for a steam plant at its organic chemical
manufacturing facility in Ohio, but its management would not approve the capital
investment necessary for installing and certifying CEMS. The City of Dover, DE decided
to withdraw its McKee Run application because it would have received too few
allowances to offset the cost of the CEMS and of joining the opt-in program. Finally, the
Iowa Interstate Power Company withdrew its application because planned modifications
to its potential opt-in source will make it an affected source under 72.6 of the Acid Rain
Regulations, and affected sources cannot opt-in. (Miller, 1997) By November 1996,
DuPont and Alcoa received admission to the opt-in program and were allocated a total of
95,882 allowances. (EPA, 1996)
3.4.1 Opt-in Program in Practice
3.4.1.1 DuPont
DuPont's New Johnsonville Plant is the world's largest producer of titanium dioxide
(TiO2) pigment. Current production is approximately 25 percent of the total TiO2
produced nationally and 10 percent of the world's production. TiO2 is a fine, white
powder used by manufacturers to produce white or opaque products. About half of New
Johnsonville's production is sold for use in paints, varnishes, and lacquers. Other large
consumers of TiO2 include the paper and plastics industries.
The TiO2 production process consumes enormous quantities of steam. Until recently,
four coal-fired boilers located on the New Johnsonville site provided the plant with its
necessary steam. However, located adjacent to the DuPont plant is Tennessee Valley
Authority's (TVA) Johnsonville Steam Plant, and because this plant produces electricity,
it is subject to the Acid Rain Provisions. By applying as a Thermal Energy Exception
within the opt-in program, DuPont was able to shut down its four boilers, obtain
replacement steam from the TVA plant, and thus reduce its overall manufacturing costs.
Title IV allows an opt-in source to transfer allowances that otherwise must be deducted
to account for a source's reduced utilization or shut down to a unit that is replacing the
thermal energy originally supplied by the opt-in source. A replacement unit must be
affected under the Acid Rain Program and prove that it actually replaces the opt-in
source's thermal energy. Allowances are transferred from the opt-in source to the
replacement unit annually and are fixed in quantity according to the Thermal Energy
Plan. The calculation of transferable allowances is based on the thermal energy provided
by and the allowable SO2 emissions rate of the replacement unit. DuPont's decision to
opt-in to the Acid Rain Program will provide TVA with about 7,000 annual allowances.
(Alexander, 1996) A Thermal Energy Plan has a fixed duration and the term of the plan
extends over full calendar years. DuPont was the first industrial site to submit an opt-in
permit application and it took approximately one year for DuPont to gain approval.
3.4.1.2 Alcoa
The Alcoa Generating Corporation (AGC), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Alcoa, owns four
units at the Warrick Generating Station which are now participating in the Acid Rain
Program. Three 144 MW units, wholly owned by AGC, are industrial boilers and are
now designated opt-in units. These units are 1960-vintage coal-fired units fueled with a
combination of high sulfur coal mined in southern Indiana and low sulfur Appalachian
coal. All of the electricity produced by the units is used to power an Alcoa aluminum
smelter located at the same site. The fourth 300 MW unit is jointly owned by AGC and
Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Company (SIGECO). Because approximately half of
this unit's power is used to supply the SIGECO system and grid, it is a named Phase I
unit under Title IV.
The three AGC opt-in units received 30,372, 30,732, and 27,668 annual allowances,
respectively, for a total allocation of 88,772 allowances. The entire opt-in process took six
years from the passage of the 1990 CAAA to the issuance of AGC's permit in June 1996.
The promulgation of the final opt-in regulations took about five years, and the
consideration of AGC's permit required another ten months. This delay disappointed
AGC and made operational planning and contracting for fuel extremely difficult.
Additionally, it prevented AGC from committing to any sales of emissions permits
because AGC did not know how many permits it was going to receive. (Rasmussen,
1997)
According to Philip Rasmussen, the President of AGC, the opt-in process involved
significant administrative and legal costs. Approximately six person-weeks were
required to resubmit data previously submitted on other governmental forms, and
additional legal and administrative costs were incurred while searching for desirable
regulatory changes that would make the program more workable for AGC. Designating
the three units as opt-in units only involved minor monitoring costs because the three
industrial boilers were already equipped with CEMS. State regulations required AGC to
purchase CEMS when AGC added natural gas co-fire capacity to the units. The cost of
the monitors, had they been required for the opt-in program, would have been about
$125,000 per unit or a total of $375,000. AGC was, however, required to make revisions
to the State environmental reporting software in order to accommodate the changes
required for acid rain reporting and these changes cost about $25,000. (Rasmussen,
1997)
In 1995 and 1996, AGC sold 5000 allowances each year to Ohio Edison. These
allowances were created, for the most part, on the Phase I named unit because the opt-in
of the other units was not accomplished until June 1996. In 1996, AGC purchased a total
of 14,482 allowances from sources including AIG Trading, Arizona Public Service, Cenex,
Emissions Trading, Ohio Edison, Enron, and Hunt Refining. AGC has a continued
obligation to supply Ohio Edison with allowances over the next three years, and beyond
that obligation, AGC will buy or sell permits depending on the current price of
allowances, high sulfur coal, and low sulfur coal.
AGC's initial incentive for designating its three units as opt-in units was both economic
and environmental. By opting in, AGC hoped to both reduce emissions and achieve
economic gains that would help keep the cost of producing aluminum at the Warrick
smelter competitive in world markets. However, the utilities' response to the Acid Rain
Program was to overbuild scrubbers thereby reducing emissions to a greater extent than
expected. This resulted in an excess of allowances in Phase I which in turn drove the
market price of allowances downward. The availability of low-cost emissions permits
prevented AGC from over-complying with its 1996 emissions requirements through the
burning of additional low sulfur coal, but provided AGC with an alternative dimension to
consider in its economic fuel burn models. AGC's ultimate decision was to utilize high
sulfur coal and buy allowances rather than to employ the additional blending of low
sulfur coal. This decision may change, however, as the price of allowances rises and the
cost differential between high and low sulfur coal diminishes.
3.4.2 The Potential for Process Sources to Enter the Opt-in Program
The opt-in program was initially designed to allow both stationary combustion and
process sources to voluntarily enter the Acid Rain Program. The final opt-in program
rules for stationary sources were promulgated in April 1995, but the rules for process
sources have yet to be finalized. Process sources are sources that emit SO2 through a
manufacturing process other than burning fossil fuels to generate steam or power and
include industries such as the cement, iron and steel manufacturing, and pulp and paper
industries.
In May 1995, the Cadmus Group published a draft report on the feasibility of process
sources entering the opt-in program. The report analyzed eleven process industries and
concluded that only three of these industries, the cement production, natural gas
processing, and primary zinc smelting industries, demonstrated an ability to monitor
plant-wide SO2 emissions to a 10 percent relative accuracy. Maintaining a 10 percent
relative monitoring accuracy over a compliance year is a minimum CEMS requirement
for participation in the Acid Rain Program. The major cause for the sources' inability to
satisfactorily monitor emissions is the fact that many process industries are
characterized by multiple processes and SO2 emissions points. In order to meet the 10
percent accuracy requirement, these plants would have to install CEMS on each stack
and "the cost of applying several CEMS would be prohibitively expensive for most
plants."21
21 The Cadmus Group, Inc., Process Source Opt-in Program Technical Background Document,
Draft, (Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, May, 1995), p. ES-3.
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Cement plants have substantial opt-in potential because cement kilns burn fuel and
generate emissions in a manner similar to electricity units. Procedures applicable to
electric utility and industrial boilers for reducing and monitoring SO 2 emissions are
generally applicable to cement plants. However, the cost of applying CEMS and tracking
SO 2 emissions limits opt-in feasibility for many cement plants. Cement plants are small
relative to the energy consumption and SO2 emissions of electric utility units, and few
plants currently monitor their SO2 emissions. Similar to the City of Dover, many cement
plants would receive too few allowances to offset the cost of opting-in to the Acid Rain
Program. In 1985, only five cement plants had emissions greater than 5,000 tons of SO2.
(The Cadmus Group, 1995)
Natural gas processing and primary zinc smelting plants are better prepared and
designed to enter the opt-in program than cement plants. Natural gas processing units
typically have only one emissions stack and virtually no fugitive SO2 emissions.
Therefore, the cost of installing CEMS is less prohibitive for these plants. SO 2 emissions
reduction options are available for primary zinc smelting plants and most plants already
have CEMS installed and operating. Of the eleven industrial process sources considered
in the Cadmus Report, only the natural gas processing and primary zinc smelting
industries appear capable of financing the cost of the CEMS. For the remaining nine
sources, installing CEMS is too costly due to either the high number of emissions stacks
that would require monitoring or the low level of SO2 allowances that would be earned
by opting-in to the Acid Rain Program.
3.5 A Comparison of the Substitution and Opt-in Programs
The substitution and opt-in programs offer electric utility and non-utility producers of
SO2 emissions the opportunity to voluntarily enter the Acid Rain Program. However,
these programs differ in two significant ways. First, the substitution program applies to
Phase II units, units that must comply with the Title IV provisions, whereas the opt-in
program is open to any stationary combustion source that emits SO2. Second,
substitution units must share a common owner or operator with a Phase I affected unit.
This requirement does not apply for opt-in units. Although these programmatic
differences appear minor, they have significant consequences on the costs of joining the
substitution and opt-in programs.
3.5.1 The "Technology of Compliance" Cost
Several costs are associated with participating in the Acid Rain Program including
administrative and compliance costs as well as the costs of interacting with the
tradeable permit market. The majority of these costs are commonly shared by the
substitution and opt-in units as these units must comply with the same emissions
regulations and interact with the same tradeable market. However, the cost of the
"technology of compliance", defined as the monitoring and information technology for
tracking emissions and establishing baseline data, differs for substitution and opt-in
units and subsequently impacts their respective decisions to enter the Acid Rain
Program.
The "technology of compliance" cost involves the cost of installing, certifying, and
operating the CEMS as well as the cost of establishing emissions inventories which is
required for all units participating in the Acid Rain Program. More specifically, the cost
of the CEMS includes hardware and software costs as well as the cost of the necessary
probes and analyzers for measuring opacity, SO2, NOx, CO, and CO2 emissions.
New England Power (NEP), a subsidiary of the New England Electric System (NEES),
provides an useful example for estimating the magnitude of the CEMS cost. Establishing
a measure of the "technology of compliance" cost is necessary for evaluating its role in
the substitution and opt-in programs. NEP owns and operates three major fossil fuel
generating facilities including Brayton Point Station, Salem Harbor Station, and
Manchester Street Station. The Brayton Point Station in Somerset, MA has three coal-
fired units that together provide 1,092 MW of baseload capacity and one dual fuel oil/gas
fired unit that provides 441 MW of intermediate cycling capacity. The Salem Harbor
Station in Salem, MA includes three coal-fired units that together generate 310 MW of
baseload capacity and one oil-fired unit that provides approximately 400 MW of
intermediate cycling capacity. Finally, the Manchester Street Station in Providence, RI
consists of three natural gas fired units totaling 420 MW.
NEP designated its four Brayton Point units and three Salem Harbor units as 1995
compensating units under Phase I of the Acid Rain Program. Naming compensating
units is entirely optional. Therefore, compensation units can be considered similar to
substitution units because both types of units are Phase II affected units that
voluntarily enter Phase I of the Acid Rain Program. By 2000, all ten of NEP's units will
be subject to the Phase II requirements of the Acid Rain Program.
Table 6: NEP's Cost of "Technology of Compliance"
MW Total Capital
(total) Cost
Brayton Point Station 1533 $6,200,000
* 3 coal-fired units 1092
* 1 dual fuel oil/gas-fired unit 441
Salem Harbor Station 710 $5,800,000
* 3 coal-fired units 310
* 1 oil-fired unit 400
Manchester Street Station 420 $4,000,000
* 3 natural gas-fired units 420
Total $16,000,000
Percentage of NEP Total Capital Cost of 14%
Compliance ($113 M)
Cost of CEMS per kilowatt (KW) of Capacity $6/KW
NEP's total capital cost of CAAA compliance has been on the order of $113 million. This
includes the capital cost of the CEMS at Brayton Point and Salem Harbor which are
estimated as $6.2 million and $5.8 million, respectively. The capital cost of the CEMS for
the Manchester Street units was not available, but is approximately $4 million.
(Kenison, 1997) Based on these numbers, the total CEMS cost is about 14 percent of
NEP's total capital cost of Title IV compliance. (Table 6) This cost does not include the
annual CEMS maintenance, calibration, and labor costs that average about $100,000
per year for each station. Although the cost of installing, certifying, and maintaining the
CEMS varies from unit to unit, NEP's estimated total capital cost of CEMS as compared
to its total cost of compliance serves as an approximate measure of the Title IV's
monitoring and information technology costs.
3.5.2 Role of the Monitoring and Information Technology Cost
All affected utility units, including potential substitution units, must have CEMS
installed and operating by 1995. Therefore, the cost of the CEMS is not an additional
cost incurred by substitution units and does not directly impact the decision to designate
a unit as a substitution unit. Opt-in sources, however, are not required to install CEMS
or to participate in the Acid Rain Program. In order to enter Title IV, these units must
not only purchase emissions monitors but also learn how to operate and maintain the
CEMS. This additional CEMS cost is a direct result of the regulatory differences between
the substitution and opt-in programs.
Table 7: Comparison of Participation in the Substitution and Opt-in Programs
Substitution Progran Opt- 10Program
Number of Units 182 7
Total Number of Allocated 1,330,000 95,882
Allowances
Number of Allowances per 7308 13,697
Unit
Percentage of Total 1995 16% 1%
Allocated Allowances 22
The level of participation has been substantially higher in the substitution program than
in the opt-in program. Almost 30 percent of the eligible units have entered the
substitution program while only two firms have been accepted to the opt-in program. As
a whole, substitution units have received about 16 percent of the total 1995 allocated
allowances, and on average, each substitution unit has received about 7300 annual
allowances. Together, the DuPont and AGC opt-in units received about 1 percent of the
1995 allocated allowances and an average of 13,697 annual allowances per unit. (Table
7) This disparity is due to the high incurred monitoring and emissions tracking costs for
opt-in units joining the Acid Rain Program as compared to the costs for substitution
units. Chapter Four presents the evidence for this hypothesis and analyzes its
implications for the development of JI projects and an international tradeable
entitlements market.
3.6 Chapter Summary
The major points presented in this Chapter are:
* The U.S. Acid Rain Program has been both an environmental and an economic
success. It is the largest public policy experiment in the use of tradeable permits and
the first trading program to incorporate voluntary compliance programs, the
substitution and opt-in programs.
* The cost of monitoring and tracking emissions is significant in the Acid Rain
Program. Based on an analysis of NEP's CEMS cost, it can amount to as much as 14
percent of the total capital cost of Title IV compliance.
* There are programmatic differences between the voluntary provisions. Substitution
units must comply with the Title IV provisions and install CEMS by 1995. Opt-in
units, however, are not mandated to enter the Acid Rain Program or invest in CEMS.
Additionally, these programs differ in that substitution units share a common owner
or operator with a Phase I unit while opt-in units do not.
* The reaction to Title IV's voluntary programs has been remarkably different. This
disparity suggests that the monitoring cost associated with Title IV compliance
deters many potential opt-in units from entering the Acid Rain Program.
22 The total number is 8,550,000 which does not account for the EPA auction allowances.
CHAPTER 4: THE "TECHNOLOGY OF COMPLIANCE" COST
4.1 The Role of the "Technology of Compliance" Cost in the
Substitution and Opt-in Programs
The decision to designate a Phase II unit a substitution unit is unaffected by the
"technology of compliance" cost because Phase II units are required to have CEMS
installed and operating by 1995. Additionally, because substitution units share a
common owner or operator with a Phase I unit, the decision to voluntarily enter the
substitution program is more fully understood in terms of its costs and benefits. The
owners and operators of Phase I units realize the implications of the Phase I emissions
requirements and are relatively experienced in dealing with the tradeable permit
market. The structure of the substitution program facilitates the incorporation of
substitution units into Phase I and helps minimize the cost associated with entering the
substitution program.
Industrial sources of SO2 are not required to install CEMS unless they participate in the
opt-in program, and therefore, they must evaluate the potential cost of monitoring and
tracking emissions when analyzing whether to join Title IV. As shown in the case of
NEES, the CEMS cost is a significant portion of the total cost of compliance. This cost
has discouraged broad participation in the opt-in program. DuPont, AGC, and the firms
that later decided to withdraw their opt-in applications clearly demonstrate the impact
of the monitoring and information technology costs on the decision to enter the Acid Rain
Program.
The cost of the CEMS did not play a role in DuPont's decision to enter the opt-in
program. By opting-in its four coal-fired boilers under the program's Thermal Energy
Exception, DuPont avoided the cost of installing CEMS. Once DuPont was accepted into
the opt-in program, DuPont simply shut down its four boilers and transferred its SO2
emissions allowances to TVA in exchange for replacement steam. The number of
allowances DuPont received was calculated from the thermal energy provided by and the
allowable emissions rate of the TVA units. The allowances are fixed in quantity and are
transferable over a specific number of years. Under the opt-in program's Thermal
Energy Exception, DuPont was never required to determine the emissions rate of its
boilers or to incur an additional monitoring cost. Rather, DuPont's only cost in joining
the Acid Rain Program was the administrative and labor costs associated with filing the
opt-in application and Thermal Energy Plan.
Similarly, AGC's decision to opt-in three industrial boilers was unaffected by the cost of
installing and operating emissions monitors. The industrial boilers were already
equipped with CEMS due to State regulations that required AGC to purchase CEMS
when it added natural gas co-fire capacity to the units. The only monitoring cost that
AGC incurred in joining the Acid Rain Program was the cost of updating its CEMS
software to accommodate the acid rain reporting requirements. This cost was estimated
at $25,000 which is minor in comparison to the capital cost of the CEMS. Therefore, the
cost of the "technology of compliance" had little impact on AGC's decision to enter the
Acid Rain Program as AGC's units already had CEMS installed and operating.
AGC's opt-in units are large units, and each unit received many more allowances than
the average substitution unit. About 30,000 allowances were allocated to each AGC unit
as compared to the average allocation of 7,000 allowances per substitution unit.
Additionally, because the AGC opt-in units had CEMS installed by 1995 and share a
common owner with a Phase I unit (the fourth Warrick unit operated by AGC and
SIGECO), they are essentially substitution units. The AGC opt-in units' similarity with
substitution units in addition to the relative size of the units meant that AGC not only
faced a low cost in entering the opt-in program, but that it could also more easily
recapture the remaining fixed cost of entering Title IV through small percentage
emissions reductions.
The hypothesis that the cost of the monitoring and tracking emissions is a barrier to
entering the opt-in program is supported by the comparison of the DuPont and AGC
cases to the experiences of Union Camp and the City of Dover. Both Union Camp and
the City of Dover cited the cost of the CEMS as a major cause for withdrawing their opt-
in applications. Union Camp's management could not justify the capital cost of the
CEMS and applying to the opt-in program given its financial situation, and the City of
Dover would have received too few allowances to offset the cost of the CEMS. (Miller,
1997) The fact that these firms stated that the cost of the CEMS played a major role in
their decision to withdraw their applications validates the hypothesis that the
"technology of compliance" cost is a deterrent to entering the opt-in program.
Additionally, the Cadmus Report, which evaluates the feasibility for process sources to
opt-in, clearly echoes the experiences of DuPont, AGC, Union Camp, and the City of
Dover. It highlights the impracticality and expense of monitoring sources with many
stacks or a small total quantity of emissions.
4.2 Alternative Explanations for the Lack of Participation in
the Opt-in Program
An alternative explanation for the low participation level in the opt-in program is the
delay in the promulgation of the opt-in program's final rules. The final opt-in program
procedures and requirements were published on April 4, 199523, approximately five years
after the passage of the 1990 CAAA. The requirements for the substitution program
were finalized on January 11, 199324, and the two year difference between the
promulgation of these programs may explain the higher number of units in the
substitution as compared to the opt-in program. There is always uncertainty
surrounding any new program, and the delay may have heightened the uncertainty
associated with the opt-in program. Additionally, the low number of participants in the
opt-in program may simply reflect the youth of the program and increase with time.
Although the delay in the promulgation of the opt-in rules may have prevented some
units from applying to the opt-in program, it does not explain the different experiences of
DuPont, AGC, Union Camp, and the City of Dover. There remains a clear distinction
between the units that were accepted to the opt-in program and the units that withdrew
their applications. The CEMS cost is minimal or absent for the units that were accepted
and high for those that withdrew their applications. Additionally, the Cadmus Group
23 40 CFR Part 74, 60 FR 17100.
report suggests that even if final rules for process sources had been promulgated, many
sources would not have participated in the opt-in program due to the cost of installing
CEMS. Therefore, it is unlikely that an earlier promulgation of the opt-in rules would
have encouraged significantly greater participation.
A second potential explanation for the disparity between the amount of participation in
the substitution and opt-in programs is the cost of learning about and participating in
the Title IV tradeable permit market. The owners of substitution units have already
incurred these costs for Phase I units so there is no additional learning cost associated
with the substitution units. The experience of the opt-in program to date suggests that
this cost is significant. AGC faced minimal learning and participation costs due to its
common ownership of the Phase I designated Warrick unit, and DuPont avoided any
learning cost by selling its permits to TVA. However, two cases are too few to determine
the full impact of this cost. Additionally, the statements by Union Camp and the City of
Dover as well as the conclusions of the Cadmus Report point to the cost of the CEMS as
the primary obstacle to joining the opt-in program.
4.3 Title IV, Joint Implementation, and Tradeable
Entitlements
Although the Acid Rain Program and a climate change policy architecture that
incorporates JI and tradeable entitlements occur on the national and international
scales, respectively, they share common frameworks. Both are designed to mitigate
emissions, employ tradeable emissions entitlements, and incorporate voluntary
agreements to increase program flexibility and participation. These similarities suggest
that there are lessons from the design and implementation of Title IV that may benefit
the development of JI projects and a tradeable emissions entitlement market.
The substitution and opt-in programs are analogous to JI projects. Both the substitution
and opt-in programs, like JI projects, are voluntary. Additionally, these programs allow
non-affected units to enter the Acid Rain Program and participate in the tradeable
24 40 CFR Part 72, 58 FR 3590.
permit market just as JI projects allow non-participating countries to earn tradeable
entitlements through emissions abatement actions. Joint Implementation projects and
an international tradeable emissions entitlement market involve many more parties,
industries, types of projects, and political interests and in general, are vastly more
complex than Title IV. Therefore, complications within the Acid Rain Program and its
voluntary programs will most likely be amplified by the JI process as well as the
international trading of emissions entitlements.
The success of JI critically depends on the ease with which JI projects can be arranged
between interested parties. If JI projects are too difficult or costly to arrange due to high
transaction costs, few projects will be undertaken and the potential gains of JI will be
lost. Additionally, there are limited resources for investing in international JI projects,
and transaction costs act to reduce the effectiveness of these resources by diminishing
the amount actually devoted to mitigating emissions. The type and size of the
transaction costs associated with investing in JI projects will depend on the criteria for
JI established by the COP as well as the institutions and procedures designed to
facilitate the JI process. A recent report by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) concluded that there are six types of transaction costs that
are likely to impede JI transactions including search costs, negotiation costs, approval or
certification costs, monitoring costs, enforcement costs, and insurance costs. (OECD,
1996)
Effective certification and monitoring procedures are necessary for ensuring compliance
in both the Acid Rain Program and an international emissions crediting program. The
cost of monitoring and tracking emissions is unavoidable for units complying with the
Title IV requirements and parties investing in JI projects. Additionally, the monitoring
procedures and requirements applied to the JI process will act to build confidence in the
tradeable emissions entitlement market and encourage greater international
participation. Among the transaction costs listed in the OECD report, the cost of
monitoring is significant because it is not only a critical component for ensuring the
integrity of the JI program but also a mandatory cost regardless of the project's type or
size. Based on the importance of the CEMS cost in the substitution and opt-in programs
and the similarity between these programs and JI projects, it is clear that monitoring
and information technology costs will influence the amount of JI investment.
The OECD Group on Economic and Environment Policy Integration conducted
interviews to determine the approximate size of the transaction costs associated with JI
projects. The Group selected projects resembling potential JI projects and attempted to
elicit the following information: 1) the search and information costs involved in choosing
the project; 2) the number of person-days lost and legal costs incurred during the
bargaining and negotiation process; 3) the monitoring and project appraisal costs; and 4)
the total travel time and cost. (OECD, 1996) Because the criteria for JI projects have not
yet been finalized, the given transaction costs are only rough approximations of the costs
that will affect actual JI projects. Table 8 presents some of the results of the OECD
report and highlights the fact that the monitoring cost constitutes a large portion of each
project's costs. The monitoring cost includes the cost of technical expertise, monitoring
equipment, and operating expenses. The search and negotiation costs are also significant
largely because these JI projects are among the first JI projects attempted. Although
these costs are in some cases comparable or greater than the monitoring cost, this thesis
focuses only on the impact of the monitoring cost.
The monitoring cost of the Reduced Impact Logging (RIL) Project and NEP's total CEMS
capital cost provide a useful comparison of the cost of entering the Acid Rain Program
and investing in a JI project. The RIL Project is an agreement between New England
Power (NEP) and Rakyat Berjaya SDN, a Malaysian forests products company, and
involves the implementation of improved forest management techniques on 1,400 of the
Malaysian company's 970,000 hectares. (OECD, 1996) The NEP pilot project, completed
in 1995, will reduce CO 2 emissions by as much as 600,000 tons over the 40 year life of
the project. The UtiliTree Carbon Company is expanding the NEP pilot project to include
an additional 2,500 acres that will sequester about 147,000 tons of CO2 by the year
2000. (International Utility Efficiency Partnerships, 1997) The total budget for the NEP
pilot project was $600,000, including $150,000 in monitoring and research costs.
Table 8: The Transaction Costs of JI Projects
JI Project Total Cost Search Negotiation Monitoring
Cost Cost Cost
Coal to Gas Conversion (CTG) Project, $400,00025 $280,000 $50,000 $50,000
Poland (12.5%)
High Efficiency Lighting Project, $1,590,00026 $97,00027 $23,000 $260,00028
Mexico (16%)
The Reduced Impact Logging Project, $600,000 $70,000 - $150,000
Malaysia (25%)
The Bynov Heating Plant Project in the $1,500,000 - $824,000 $300,000
City of Decin, The Czech Republic (20%)
Mbaracayu Conservation Project, - $10,000 $15,000 $225,000
Paraguay
An international Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) is responsible for monitoring
the RIL project and for verifying its GHG benefits. The EAC includes the Forest
Research Institute of Malaysia, the Rainforest Alliance, and the University of Florida.
Research efforts to quantify and estimate CO2 emissions reductions were led by Dr.
Francis Putz of the University of Florida during the pilot phase of the project, and these
efforts will continue under the expanded project. The expanded project will also
incorporate research on the methane component of the RIL emissions. The EAC does not
rely on a standardized method for calculating GHG emissions reductions but is in the
process of developing a more reliable method for calculating the GHG benefits of carbon
sequestration projects. (International Utility Efficiency Partnerships, 1997)
A comparison of NEP's cost of monitoring for the RIL Project and NEP's monitoring and
emissions tracking costs under Title IV supports the theory that the complexity of JI
projects may amplify the comparable costs of entering the Acid Rain Program. The cost
of monitoring the RIL Project is approximately 25 percent of the total project cost and is
25 This total cost is the cost of an initial GEF project feasibility study and does not include the
total project cost.
26 Only includes the management cost of the project.
27 Equals one half of the cost of surveys for the purpose of monitoring and research.
28 Includes one half of the cost of surveys for the purpose of monitoring and research.
significantly higher than NEP's 14 percent cost of complying with the Acid Rain
Program's CEMS requirement. This is a rough comparison because the monitoring costs
described in the OECD report do not directly correspond to the cost of installing,
operating, and maintaining the CEMS. Whether this amplification occurs for all JI
projects or not, it illustrates that monitoring and information technology costs are
substantial in the JI process.
4.4 Conclusions for Joint Implementation and a Tradeable
Entitlement Market
Although the projects presented in Table 8 are only representative JI projects, they
suggest a strong similarity between investing in JI projects and entering the opt-in
program. First, none of the JI projects shown involves a single owner or investor as
required by the substitution program. Second, there is little homogeneity between the
types of JI projects. A JI project is any international project that seeks to reduce, avoid,
or sequester GHG emissions and can involve a variety of abatement activities such as
reforestation, conservation, or fuel-switching. The heterogeneity of the JI projects
resembles the heterogeneity of the combustion and process source industries that are
eligible to join the opt-in program. As shown by the Cadmus Group report and by the
range of opt-in applicants, each source varies in terms of the type and quantity of
emissions it produces as well as its number of emissions points. More importantly, each
opt-in and JI project is unique and therefore, demands its own specific set of monitoring
procedures and equipment. Finally, JI projects and opt-in units both incur a significant
monitoring cost by voluntarily agreeing to reduce emissions. Joint Implementation
investors, unlike substitution unit owners, cannot consider the monitoring expense
independently from the cost of the JI project.
The experience of the substitution and opt-in programs as well as the similarity between
these programs and JI projects suggest that Annex I multi-national companies (MNCs)
are in the strongest position to invest in JI. Similar to Phase I unit owners, MNCs can
take advantage of their familiarity with GHG emissions monitoring requirements and
techniques to reduce the transaction costs associated with investing in JI. The Southern
Company owns, wholly or partially, generating units in the U.S. and China. Similar to
other MNCs, the Southern Company already understands the technicalities of reporting
emissions due to its operations in an Annex I country. China Light and Power, Ltd.,
however, owns units in non-Annex I countries and faces a higher learning cost in
investing in and monitoring JI projects. Therefore, for identical MNC and China Light
and Power plants located in a JI host country, there is a greater expectation that the
MNC plant will become a JI project due to the lower transaction costs associated with its
emissions compliance. The MNCs' previous monitoring experience acts to internalize the
"technology of compliance" cost and lower the total cost of investing in JI.
The Cadmus Report, on the feasibility of process sources entering the opt-in program,
highlights the difficulty in addition to the cost of monitoring sources with many
emissions points and low total emissions. Based on this analysis, successful JI projects
are likely to be those projects which require minimal monitoring but involve a relatively
large amount of emissions. The relative cost of tracking emissions is reduced when only
a few number of emissions sources must be monitored. Additionally, more credits can be
potentially gained when the initial emissions baseline is high. Larger JI projects offer
the opportunity to achieve substantial GHG emissions reductions thereby furthering
environmental and international support for JI as a policy instrument for mitigating
climate change.
4.5 Recommendations for Minimizing the "Technology of
Compliance" Cost
The OECD Group on Economic and Environment Policy Integration's report concludes
that "transaction costs, implicitly or explicitly imposed, are probably the single most
serious threat to the eventual emergence of a JI market."29 The impact of the cost of the
"technology of compliance" on the Acid Rain Program's voluntary programs supports this
claim and suggests that any reduction in the impact of this cost can only benefit the
development of JI projects and a tradeable emissions entitlement market. There are four
specific recommendations for diminishing monitoring and emissions tracking costs and
for encouraging broader JI investment.
First, the emissions reporting procedures and requirements for JI projects must be
standardized. Standardizing these procedures will lower JI monitoring and emissions
tracking costs because it will clarify the reporting needs and thereby define the technical
monitoring requirements for JI projects. In considering possible alternatives, it is
important that the COP evaluate the technical impact of imposing specific monitoring
requirements. The monitoring requirements do not necessarily have to be technology-
based but could simply account for the carbon content of fuel consumed. Once the
requirements for the monitoring equipment are known, JI investors can dedicate more
resources to improving the current methods rather than to searching out possible
monitoring systems. Some of the current monitoring cost associated with JI projects is
the cost of the technical expertise necessary for developing appropriate monitoring
procedures. Implementing standard reporting procedures reduces the need to
individually design monitoring specifications for each JI project and therefore, helps
reduce the overall information technology cost associated with JI investment.
Second, the COP should designate an international organization as a central source for
technical monitoring information. The organization will gather data on the applicable
monitoring equipment and procedures for each type of JI project and assume the
responsibility for maintaining and diffusing this information. This action will have a
similar effect as standardizing the reporting procedures for JI in that it will lessen the
technical uncertainties of investing in a JI project. Additionally, by assigning this task to
an international organization, the COP will signal its support of JI to potential investors
and encourage further JI investment.
Third, the COP must encourage public and private institutions to finance, publicize, and
organize JI projects. Transaction costs reduce the amount of JI investment partially due
to the general lack of available financing for JI projects. According to many electric
utilities and IPPs interviewed by the DOE, the lack of financing is a primary obstacle to
JI investment. (Petricone and Vetleseter, 1995) Increasing the amount of available JI
29 OECD, Joint Implementation, Transaction Costs, and Climate Change, Group on Economic
and Environmental Policy Integration (Paris: OECD, August 1996), p. 51.
financing decreases the potential impact of high monitoring costs and facilitates
investment in more JI projects. Additionally, publicizing and organizing JI projects
diminishes the risk and management costs incurred by JI investors. As shown in Table
8, the search and negotiation costs are a large component of the JI project cost, and any
effort to publicize available JI projects would help reduce these costs as well.
As final recommendation to diminish the impact of the monitoring and information
technology costs on JI is for the COP to favor larger JI projects over smaller ones and to
encourage MNCs to invest in JI. Increasing the size of the project reduces the relative
size of the monitoring cost to the total project cost. Larger projects may involve higher
administrative and management costs, but the monitoring cost appears to be a more
dominant factor in deciding on whether to invest in JI. Additionally, as mentioned
earlier, larger projects can potentially earn more emissions offsets than smaller projects,
and MNCs are in a more advantageous position to invest in JI projects. Therefore, by
encouraging MNCs and others to invest in JI, the COP will reduce the potential impact
of the "technology of compliance" cost and test the limits of the environmental gains
accrued through JI.
4.6 Chapter Summary
The major points presented in this Chapter are:
* Joint Implementation projects are analogous to the substitution and opt-in programs.
* Monitoring requirements are essential for ensuring the integrity of JI projects and
tradeable emissions entitlement market. These requirements, however, demand a
substantial investment in installing, operating, and maintaining emissions
monitoring equipment as demonstrated by the experience of the substitution and opt-
in units and early JI projects.
* Credible guidelines for reporting emissions data must be designed in order to
encourage broad JI participation. Transaction costs are a barrier to investing in JI,
but their impact can be limited through improved institutional and procedural
guidelines.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
In December of 1997, the COP will meet in Kyoto to discuss the design of an
international protocol to guide GHG emissions reduction efforts in the post-2000 period.
Joint Implementation and a tradeable emissions entitlement market have been
significant elements in the COP negotiations and have gained greater emphasis as a
result of the U.S. Draft Protocol Framework. The Kyoto meeting provides a motivation
for clarifying JI procedures and requirements, but further investment in JI does not
depend on the outcome at Kyoto. Interest in JI is likely to persist, perhaps as an
abatement option for Annex I countries or as part of a broader policy architecture for
mitigating climate change. Given this continuing interest in JI, the Acid Rain Program
provides an useful example for analyzing the requirements and potential barriers to JI.
Credible certification and monitoring procedures are essential for establishing confidence
in the JI process and tradeable emissions entitlement market. Title IV's CEMS
monitoring requirement ensures compliance with the SO2 emissions reduction
requirements and maintains the integrity of the tradeable permit market. Due to the
CEMS accuracy, utility units and EPA are confident that the tradeable permits reflect
tangible emissions reductions. This confidence eliminates the need for EPA to approve
each permit transaction, frees the tradeable permit market from unnecessary regulatory
interference, and allows the permits to be properly valued by the market. The JI process
will demand a similar level of monitoring as required in the Acid Rain Program.
Appropriate JI monitoring procedures and requirements must be designed to hold down
these costs while also maintaining the integrity of the international trading system.
The learning costs associated with interacting with the tradeable entitlement market
also appear significant. The experience of Title IV's substitution program suggests that
those who are already involved in the trading program are more likely to participate.
These participants have already incurred any learning costs through previous
interactions with the tradeable permit market. In the context of JI, the learning cost can
be minimized through the participation of MNCs or other Annex I parties. Not only do
these participants bring monitoring and other technical expertise to JI projects but they
also bring the motivation to achieve tangible emissions reductions.
The experience of the Acid Rain Program demonstrates that the response to voluntary
programs can be large when transaction costs are low. The monitoring and learning
costs associated with complying and participating in Title IV have deterred greater
participation in the opt-in program but not affected participation in the substitution
program. Based on this analysis, it is clear that minimizing the these costs will allow
interested parties to more easily arrange JI projects and will further the potential
economic and environmental gains of JI.
5.1 Recommendations for Further Research
Negotiations at the Kyoto meeting will reveal the extent of international approval for JI
and tradeable emissions entitlements. Depending on the level of international
agreement, the Kyoto meeting may also result in an international protocol for reducing
GHG emissions. These two developments will help clarify the JI monitoring and
certification requirements and therefore, the potential impact of the "technology of
compliance" cost on the JI process and the development of an tradeable emissions
entitlement market. Further research can employ the progress made at Kyoto to more
closely examine the role of this cost in JI projects. Through an analysis of individual JI
projects as well as the proposed certification and monitoring requirements, specific
recommendations can be made for minimizing the transaction costs associated with JI
and an international tradeable emissions entitlement market. Additionally, by the end of
1997, additional information on the Acid Rain Program's substitution and opt-in
programs will be available, and this information may provide further insight into the
potential barriers to successfully implementing JI and a system of tradeable GHG
emissions entitlements.
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